Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, by John A. Nagl
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Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, by John A. Nagl
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From one of the most important Army officers of his generation, a memoir of the military’s revolution in counterinsurgency warfare Delivering a profound education in modern warfare, John Nagl’s Knife Fights is essential reading for anyone who cares about the fate of America’s soldiers and the purposes for which their lives are put at risk.As an army tank commander in the first Gulf War, Nagl was an early convert to the view that America’s greatest future threats would come from asymmetric warfare—guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents. His Oxford thesis on the lessons of Vietnam—eventually published as a book called Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife—became the bible of the counterinsurgency movement. But it would take 9/11 and the botched aftermath of the Iraq invasion to give his ideas contemporary relevance. After a year’s hard fighting in Iraq’s Anbar Province, where Nagl served as operations officer of a tank battalion in the 1st Infantry Division, he was asked by General David Petraeus to coauthor the new Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual—rewriting core doctrine that would change the course of two wars and the thinking of an army. Knife Fights is the definitive account of counterinsurgency and its consequences by the man who was the doctrine’s leading architect.
Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, by John A. Nagl - Amazon Sales Rank: #624449 in Books
- Published on: 2015-10-13
- Released on: 2015-10-13
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 8.40" h x .71" w x 5.50" l, 1.00 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 288 pages
Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, by John A. Nagl Review Foreign Policy:“[An] invaluable memoir of service…[KNIFE FIGHTS] is also a cautionary tale of how the U.S. Army became an ‘un-learning’ institution, ‘over-learning’ the lessons from Vietnam that were most convenient to its bureaucratic interests and ‘under-learning’ those lessons most central to victory in this type of warfare…Nagl’s exceptional memoir chronicles an important period in the wars of insurgency the United States waged following 9/11; it is also a story of how one professional soldier received a brutal education not just in war but in the harsh reality of politics.” Cleveland Plain Dealer: “Nagl, steeped in both the theory and practice of modern war, speaks authoritatively… This distinguished soldier-scholar continues to render valuable service with this thoughtful, important book.”Harper’s Magazine:“Nagl devoted the next twenty years to teaching the Pentagon table manners. ‘Eating Soup with a Knife’ inspired the title of his dissertation and his intellectual rallying cry. KNIFE FIGHTS is the story of [Nagl’s] career and an intellectual genealogy of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine… A window into how the Pentagon thinks and, crucially, how it—slowly—changes its mind.”Foreign Affairs:“This engaging book exhibits droll humor and a sharp grasp of the limits and possibilities of the U.S. Army as a learning organization.”Washington Times:“Writing a book about formulating military doctrine for a general audience is no easy task, but Nagl has mastered the challenge. His memoir, KNIFE FIGHTS, revolves around the writing of the American doctrine for counter-insurgency, and his wry wit and writing skill make it a good read, even for casual readers.”Library Journal:“An honest and informative glimpse into both the past and the future of the ongoing war on terror. Military buffs, policy wonks, and anyone wishing to learn more about America’s role in the world should find Nagl’s work an alluring and important read.”Kirkus Reviews:“A lively memoir that combines battlefield experiences with military politics…A thoughtful, lucid, not-terribly-optimistic autobiography of a scholarly soldier.”Publishers Weekly:“Nagl writes evocatively about his wartime experiences, clearly explaining his theories of waging asymmetric warfare. A critic of the Iraq war ('a war that did not need to be fought'), Nagl offers perceptive critiques of the serious mistakes made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the military’s general officer corps… Nagl makes a strong case that the next war the U.S. engages in will require stronger counterinsurgency planning than Pentagon policy makers currently anticipate.”Booklist:“An essential addition to military history collections.”General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army (Ret.), commander of the surge in Iraq:"A wonderfully readable and strikingly forthright memoir by a brilliant Army officer turned think tank leader who achieved an exceptional record on the battlefield, in the academic arena, in a high-powered job in the Pentagon, and as one of the so-called 'insurgents' who helped transform the way the U.S. military thought about, prepared for, and conducted the wars of the post-9/11 era."General Jim Mattis, U.S. Marines (Ret.):"John Nagl's illuminating journey as a combat Soldier-Leader-Thinker provides a refreshing perspective of the changing character of today's security challenges. To those searching for a relevant and historically grounded understanding of today's erupting realities, his book is uniquely enlightening."Admiral James Stavridis (Ret.), Supreme Allied Commander at NATO 2009-2013 and current Dean of The Fletcher School at Tufts University:"In Knife Fights, John Nagl takes the reader from the halls of the Pentagon to the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan, and illuminates the modern battlefields - both in Washington and overseas - in harsh and vivid light. His work on counterinsurgency is deep and profound, and this book is the essential back story both of the intellectual process that underpins it and the personal journey that formed it. A powerful and meaningful memoir that will resonate in today's Army and tomorrow's society."Peter R. Mansoor, Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.); author, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War:"A magnificent memoir from one of the most brilliant officers of his generation. Knife Fights details John Nagl's journey from the halls of West Point and Oxford to the battlefields of Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as his struggles and triumphs among Washington's power elite. Highly recommended for those who seek to understand how the Army overcame its initial dysfunction to wage the messy counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan."F. G. Hoffman, National Defense University, Washington DC:"There are many books from veterans of America's costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Few will combine the intellectual heft, emotional power, and exemplary moral courage of John Nagl's Knife Fights. It traces the development of the author from his early days as a cadet at West Point to the darkest days of fighting in Al Anbar province in Iraq and beyond. This book will stand on its own special shelf as a personal memoir of a soldier/scholar, a warrior and a great teacher. Highly recommended for all military students, and anyone interested in the journey of an institutional insurgent and patriot who followed his own path."Robert D. Kaplan:"Brimming with poignancy and integrity, John Nagl's book is an instant classic of America's decade of war in the Greater Middle East. Its core argument, moreover, is undeniable: that insurgency and counterinsurgency have been part of the history of war since antiquity and thus will be part of its future. May the United States Army and Marine Corps hold close the lessons of this book!"David E. Johnson, senior researcher at the RAND Corporation; inaugural director of the Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group; author of Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945, Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza, and The 2008 Battle of Sadr City: Reimagining Urban Combat:"John Nagl's Knife Fights is a brave book by a soldier - scholar who has always put himself out there for the right reasons. John's remarkable memoir is a directed telescope into how the U.S. Army changed its doctrinal paradigm for the first time since World War I from 'closing with and destroying the enemy' to 'protecting the population.' Readers will also see that he was a key intellectual force in this shift and how difficult these changes are for the institutions - and for the catalytic advocates like John."Peter Maass, author of Love Thy Neighbor:"John Nagl has written an exceptional book that shows in words the type of bravery he exhibited on the battlefield. Nagl deftly reveals what worked and didn't work in Washington, Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11. His critique of Donald Rumsfeld is uniquely powerful because he writes from the vantage point of an Army officer who waged war in the Sunni Triangle and afterwards served in the defense secretary's office. Knife Fights is essential reading - the rare memoir of war that integrates ideas, combat and politics. It is an invaluable addition to the literature of wars that we are still trying to comprehend."
About the Author John A. Nagl is a retired lieutenant colonel of the U.S. Army. A graduate of West Point and a Rhodes Scholar, he received his PhD from St. Antony’s College, Oxford. He is the former president of the Center for a New American Security and the ninth headmaster of the Haverford School in Pennsylvania.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
This is a book about modern wars and how they affect the lives of young men and women. It is a tale of wars that needed to be fought and wars that were not necessary but that happened nonetheless, at enormous cost in blood and treasure. It is also an intellectual coming-of-age story, that of both the author and the institution to which he devoted most of his adult life, the American military. It is a book about counterinsurgency and its journey from the far periphery of U.S. military doctrine to its center, for better and, some would argue, for worse. It is also, then, a book about America’s role in the world, and specifically about when and how we use military force abroad in the name of national security.
The book largely takes the form of a memoir, which feels somewhat self-indulgent to me—I was very much more shaped by than shaper of the events this book relates. But my hope is that following the arc of my own learning curve will be the easiest way for a reader to understand the broader story of the American military’s radical adaptation to a world of threats very different from those involving nuclear weapons and Soviet tanks massed at the Fulda Gap that I studied at West Point a generation ago. Following that arc will also help to explain why, after decades of responsibility for the lives of American soldiers, I have recently shouldered the responsibility to prepare another generation of young men for a life of service far from the battlefield, in the classrooms and on the playing fields of friendly strife as the ninth headmaster of The Haverford School.
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39 of 52 people found the following review helpful. Not So Much a Memoir As a Résumé For 2016: You Decide Whether That's a Good or a Bad Thing By M. Hallisey John Nagl is known for penning a dissertation that eventually became a book that was a part of the process that led to the U.S. military's paradigm shift regarding military counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine and operations. As a result, Nagl is somewhat of a celebrity in certain (military) policy circles. "Knife Fights" is presented as a memoir of the author's career and a behind-the-scenes peek at the evolution of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and its effect on operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan."Knife Fights" - as a memoir - is okay at best. Nagl would have you believe he led a remarkable life, but truth be told his story is pretty much the story of any military officer of any era. When his career does differ it is due to the networking and connections afforded him by West Point (U.S. Military Academy); most officers do not have (or ruthlessly exploit) the connections given to Nagl as a result of West Point.Knife Fights" - as a book that explains the importance of "Learning to Eat Soup..." - is less than satisfactory. First of all, "Learning to eat Soup..." is not nearly as important as Nagl (or his supporters) would have you believe. When he is addressing COIN Nagl expends significant effort getting the reader to believe how complex COIN ops are. But truth be told, COIN ops are not really "rocket science" (either as a concept or in execution). COIN ops are nothing more than providing a safe environment so that "the locals" feel safer dealing with the so-called legitimate government than they do dealing with the so-called insurgent movement. In the end, COIN ops are very much like what police officers do on a daily basis: think the Bronx in the 1970s ("The French Connection") or any other tough urban setting. So while COIN is simple in theory and can be simple in practice, it is a tough "row to hoe" in practice for the military because it works against three virtually immovable objects: soldier training, equipment resourcing, and senior leader ego.Soldiers who have been trained to kill must work against everything they have learned since enlistment: that sometimes it is necessary not to kill. Battlefield leaders have to understand that the measures they usually take wrt "force protection" cannot be taken (thus violating one of a military leader's most basic responsibilities: to keep the troops safe. Take, for example, the different approach U.K. soldiers took in Iraq: at least initially the Brits wore no helmets and relatively little body armor while engaged in non-combat COIN operations and U.K. leaders told U.S. leaders repeatedly that U.S. insistence on full "battle-rattle" undermined the whole "hearts & minds" effort). COIN ops require not only a completely different mindset, but they also require a dramatically different equipment set. If COIN ops are going to remain the responsibility of the U.S. military then we have to accept that the military will have 2 very different equipment and vehicle sets in the supply room and motor pool. But the biggest challenge remains senior leader ego: senior military commanders want to be remembered as the next George Patton, not the next George Crook.Nagl is a bit disingenuous in asserting that the Army lacked a vibrant conversation on COIN (or other OOTW missions). Contrary to his claims, there has always been a vibrant COIN conversation in the military both as a subset of OOTW and on its own (or perhaps it is better to say, at least in the circles of the Army I was involved in). Taking lessons from the American Revolution, the frontier Indian Wars, the Philippine Insurrection, and others (especially in the days leading up to, during, and post-Bosnia and post-Kosovo), many Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs; the Army's cultural and regional specialists) argued - like Nagl - that Desert Storm was an anomaly and not the future of foreseeable future military (Army) operations. Among the many recommendations that came out of these discussions was for the Army to assign "fist/hammer operations" (i.e., hard combat or peace-making) to the active Army and "velvet glove operations" (i.e., military operations of a lesser intensity than combat such as peace-keeping and other stability operations) to the Reserve and National Guard (the idea being that Guard/Reserve "citizen-soldiers" would be better suited/attuned to these kind of operations than active duty Army soldiers or Marines).If you believe Nagl he was a "voice crying in the wilderness" and was essentially the sole voice of the future, but that simply wasn't the case. Nagl does a disservice to the many civil affairs, psych ops, special ops, FAO, and other folks who were well ahead of Nagl. If Nagl is to be credited with anything it is that he succeeded where so many else failed (but only up to that point; it was inevitable that COIN was going to be an assigned military mission whether Nagl had published or not). And Nagl is certainly not alone is decrying the decision to invade Iraq or the lack of post-combat "occupation" plans once the decision was made. He takes far too much credit in these things; yes, he was a player, but with a small, not capital, "P." At the end of the day, he was still a junior officer who was used rather than being a user and not nearly so important as he would have you believe (or believes himself; the "me"-ness in the book is simply astounding: if Nagl is to be believed he was responsible for - among a myriad of other things - getting now-retired General David Petraeus to do his bidding in getting journal articles Nagl was involved with moved to the front of the "Military Review" publishing queue (when Petraeus was Commandant of the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth), getting then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to understand the need for and then fast-track production/delivery of mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles, and getting now-Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster (author of Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (Paperback)) promoted into the general officer corps. What is there left to do as a junior field grade officer once you've grown accustomed to having the DoD's most senior officials do your bidding...?).But this "voice in the wilderness"/stalwart warrior image is an essential aspect of "Knife Fights" because the book is not so much a look back at Nagl's career as Nagl laying out his résumé for a senior position in the Department of Defense, State Department, or NSC should the Democrats retain the White House in 2016. "Knife Fights" is unabashedly partisan: Nagl works hard to establish his Democratic bona fides by hammering everything (with two exceptions) the Bush administration did in Iraq and Afghanistan while going incredibly easy on the Clinton or Obama administrations (or, hedging his bets, Hillary Clinton). Nagl is thorough in his critique of Bush (and his Vulcans), but strangely silent on Benghazi, the rise of ISIS, or any other Obama misstep. Nagl is incredibly soft on President Clinton's and General David Petraeus' extra-marital adventures. Calling them essentially unfortunate episodes and soft-peddling any Clinton or Obama missteps, Nagl clearly doesn't want to offend Democratic power brokers believing that doing so will hurt his chances for a senior political position. And while he criticizes Republicans (or under-criticizes Democrats) he makes sure he compliments those he believes will be in the inner circle of a 2016 Democratic White House (such as Michèle Flournoy).Nagl also goes to great lengths to avoid criticizing and to praise former Secretary of Defense Gates as clearly Gates is one of his heroes. This is no bad thing as I too believe Gates is deserving of great praise. But Nagl's praise is disingenuous: Gates is essentially an independent and accepted by both sides of the aisle so Nagl doesn't want to do anything that would prevent using Gates as a reference; no need to burn unnecessary bridges, as it were. In perhaps what is a bit of "hero worship," sly positioning, or both, Nagl ends "knife Fights" with his acceptance as headmaster of The Haverford School in Philadelphia thus mimicking Gates (who left government service to be president of Texas A&M prior to returning to service) and keeping himself within shouting distance of Washington, DC. Should the Democrats retain control of the White House in 2016 I have sincere doubts that Nagl will keep his promise to serve out his tenure as headmaster at Haverford until his son graduates from it.Everything Nagl has done before and since his retirement - his claims to the contrary - has been done to position himself exactly where he is now: an attempt to establish himself as an in-waiting "power player among power players" and one who deserves one of the few power positions on the inside.This is all well and good: Nagl is free to support whatever politics/politicians that float his boat, propound whatever views he sees fit, and angle for whatever job he wants. But I confess to not liking the man "Knife Fights" presents finding his ethics, professionalism, and perspective while in uniform disconcerting. In "Knife Fights" we see an officer who thinks there's nothing wrong with discussing politics with a junior subordinate officer (where Nagl adopted the anti-Bush position). In the 1990s Democrats complained about what they rightly saw as the politicization of the military officer corps as incidents of anti-Clinton comments made by officers were being reported. The Army (I believe the other services, as well) issued "orders of the day" to remind its officers that commissioned service was an apolitical affair and that such comments could be construed as violations of Article 88 of the UCMJ ("Contempt toward Officials"). I'm curious why Nagl doesn't see his conversations as having been inappropriate (is it because the UCMJ doesn't apply when the President is a Republican?).Nagl would have you believe he was an officer who spoke truth to power and risked his career, but given his connections what was he really risking? And to be frank, while trying to get COIN into the Army's everyday missions list took effort it's a stretch to say that it took bravery. One episode where Nagl could have shown moral courage was one in which he failed miserably: Nagl claims (conveniently after the heat has long since died down) that he was a co-author with Paul Yingling of the (in)famous 2007 Armed Forces Journal article, "A Failure in Generalship," but chose - in a decision he claims he still has yet to come to terms with - to remove his own name as co-author. Nagl can say whatever he wants, but he blinked (and blinked badly).Nagl's description of his service as one of hardship is ludicrous. Excepting his two tours in Iraq (something most soldiers in the military have done and more) Nagl's career was one of privilege, one where he picked his own poison, and certainly not one of any real hardship. Certainly unintentional, but "Knife Fights" describes the career of a pampered West Pointer who is 100 percent political 100 percent of the time; an officer who was never reluctant to use his USMA connections to get whatever he wanted whenever he wanted it and when he finally does not get what he wants he quits. He is an officer I'm glad I never met, worked with, or supervised; "Knife Fights" portrays an officer who was/is a snob, is an unapologetic elitist, and an officer who reinforces the often not-undeserved stereotype of the ring-knocking West Point diva. Nagl is far more a Massengale than the Damon he thinks he is.The narrative in all "good" memoirs serves the author's purposes, not History's. "Knife Fights" is no different. Nagl is angling for a job; not writing good history. Whether that is good or bad is something each reader will have to decide for him/herself. Hence, 3 stars (at best).
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful. A very smart review of military policy in the 21st century and ... By Adam Orden A very smart review of military policy in the 21st century and exposes the absolute failure of the behemoth Army / Pentagon to update its strategy over the last 20 years; and further the failure of the politicians to listen to the expert opinions of leaders like Dr Nagl. On the down side there is a LOT of repetition; a good editor was needed. On the whole; a worthy read for anyone interested in the military strategy for counter-terrorism.
9 of 11 people found the following review helpful. Sage advice for future wars By Connie This is part memoir of John Nagl's army career that began with Operation Desert Storm, to his 2008 retirement. As a young tank commander in 1991 through two decades, Nagl has seen the US Army transform from a post Cold War mindset to an army fraught with fighting Middle Eastern extremist insurgencies.The memoir part is typical in scope of most military officers I have read over the years: congratulatory and typical of the US military viewpoint. But what gives this memoir credence is Nagl's critical analyses of how the Iraqi War from 2003 was managed. He's quick to pass blame to the leaders in the administration, most noticeably Donald Rumsfeld and his cronies, who fought a very visible personal war against Secretary of State Colin Powell. Like many officers at the time, there were questions about how a post-war Iraq would fare; there were no plans in the books for that. Thus the Iraqi insurgency was born.The three mistakes that Nagl mentions that the administration did wrong have been repeated by many other military personnel since 2003: there were not enough US troops to secure the conventional weapons after the war, preventing Iraqi troops to assist in securing the population, and placing everyone in a subordinate position under Rumsfeld. "If the Department of Defense had been trying to set conditions for irregular war, it could hardly have done better" (65) states Nagl. He now found himself fighting an irregular war with conventional equipment such as the Abrams M1A1 tank that was not meant to sustain combat in desert conditions.Nagl's tour in Iraq in the early part of the war (2003-2004) are the most interesting parts of his memoir. He's now a seasoned captain and learns to improvise much of his equipment: detonating roadside bombs with machine-gun fire on the M1. Stories of using "hillbilly armor" are all too popular, and his units had to do much of the same thing in those early years. Nagl gives repeated examples of how the Iraqi citizens were more afraid of their own insurgents than they were of US forces, because they understood that the insurgents would willingly kill their own people in front of their own villagers. Nagl learns quickly that text-book insurgency fighting was easier to write about than perform in combat.Nagl loses men while fighting insurgents, and loses quite a few more from roadside bombs. It's clear he's upset over having to fight in Iraq with substandard equipment and training that insurgents quickly infiltrate. Intelligence and communication between the allied Iraq forces they were working with, and even back at the Pentagon, were often incomplete or false. Now in a war that had hired many US contractors (many former veterans), maintaining personnel and security was even more critical. American casualties were mounting.Nagl spent the rest of his career trying to convince the Pentagon (and the White House) that the US was fighting a dangerous insurgent force in Iraq (and then Afghanistan). Subsequent chapters drop a few names, criticize some players, and there are subtle hints that Nagl should be thanked for writing a book on insurgency warfare even before he had experienced insurgent warfare in combat. (There is much mention of his work on the updated "Counterinsurgency Field Manual.") The tone in the second half of the book gets more critical of the White House, especially when his mentor, General David Petraeus, is forced to resign his post-combat job at the CIA for his trail of infidelities. President Obama, Nagl goes on, doomed his efforts in Afghanistan by announcing a pull-out date for US troops there, in effect allowing the insurgents time to plan their counter-move. But Americans want times and dates and Obama's decision was a populist one.The final two chapters perhaps are most useful to today's war in Afghanistan and with Syria and ISIS. Turning from memoir to military analysis (fighting an insurgency is only 20% military, and the rest political, economical and civilian-supported, according to Nagl). The end result is a mixed bag, and it's always easier to criticize warfare in hindsight.This is an insightful book for military tacticians, military historians, and anyone fascinated with our current involvement in the Middle East and Islamic extremists. Insurgent warfare is not natural for the American warrior, but it is what our future military will be facing.
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Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, by John A. Nagl
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Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, by John A. Nagl
